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EFFECTS OF MARKET LIBERALIZATION 
ON FOOD SECURITY IN TANZANIA
H.K.R. Amani, S.M. Kapunda, N.H.I. Lipumba, and B.J. Ndulu*
INTRODUCTION
During the past decade, Tanzania has faced an unprecedented economic 
crisis, characterised by severe balance of payments disequilibria, high infla­
tion, and large government budget deficits. Population has grown more 
rapidly than gross domestic product. Shortages of consumer goods were 
widespread and intermittent food shortage had to be met by food imports.
To tackle the economic crisis, government implemented several 
adjustment and stabilization programmes (Ndulu and Lipumba, 1986). These 
policies culminated in significant devaluation and the liberalization of imports 
financed by privately-owned foreign exchange. Restrictions on private trade 
b  food grains were relaxed. In June 1986, the government adopted the 
World Bank and IMF-supported Economic Recovery Programme (ERP). The 
policy measures taken included a major devaluation and a crawling peg to 
correct future overvaluation, control of the growth of government 
expenditures to reduce and limit government borrowing from the banking 
system, increases in agricultural producer prices, and further relaxation of 
restrictions on private trade in major food grains. The policy thrust has 
been to adopt market-oriented policy instruments and to depend less on 
state-controlled procedures. Since 1984 government has further liberalized 
the economy.
FOOD SECURITY AND MARKET LIBERALIZATION
Food security and self-sufGdency
Broadly defined, food security means "access by all people at all times to 
enough food for an active, healthy life" (World Bank, 1986). It entails both 
the availability of food and the ability of all members of society to have 
access to adequate amounts of food. At the aggregate level, the country 
should have adequate food from production, stocks, and imports to meet its 
citizen’s food requirement for an active healthy life. At the household and 
individual level, all citizens should have entitlement to adequate food (Sen, 
1982).
In an economy where food markets function reasonably well and the 
supply of food is adequate, household and individual food security depend on
^Economics Department, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
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income distribution. Individuals with adequate incomes will have access to 
adequate food; but those with inadequate incomes will face food insecurity, 
even when the country as a whole has adequate surplus stocks. Thus, pol­
icies that help generate incomes to the poor will improve their food security. 
Where food markets do not function properly, food insecurity may increase- 
even when individuals have adequate money incomes. In such instances, im­
proving the performance of food markets will generally improve food secu­
rity.
Food self-sufficiency, supplying staple food requirements from domestic 
production, is not a necessary condition for food security (Tollens, 1985). 
With adequate foreign exchange reserves, a country can import food to guar­
antee food security (Donaldson, 1984). However, for countries with chronic 
balance of payments disequilibrium, adequate domestic production is a baric 
element in the food security equation.
At the household level, dependence on subsistence production and limited 
participation in the market may increase food insecurity. Poor climate will 
lead to severe transitory food insecurity. Specialisation in nonfood crops 
does not necessarily decrease food security, as long as food markets perform 
reasonably well. Indeed, food security mil improve if specialization increase 
real incomes. On the other hand, where food markets do not function well, 
specialization in nonfood crops will decrease food security. In general, poor 
performance of food markets will discourage specialization according to re­
gional comparative advantages which, in turn, will decrease national income.
Meaning o f market liberalization
Market liberalization, as a concept, refers to reducing state control of mar­
kets. It assumes market distortions exist as a consequence of government 
interventions in both factor and product markets; and that the distortions 
result in significant opportunity costs in terms of growth. These interven­
tions are justified largely by the rejection of normative judgements of free 
markets, regarding short-run distributional and welfare concerns of the state. 
Where the state, rather than the market, makes the allocative decision 
directly, prices are set to reflect perceived social values and needs (Timmer, 
1986). If prices significantly deviate from their scarcity value, a major con­
flict arises between short-run policy concerns about welfare needs and the 
long-run growth prospects which require efficient use of scarce resources.
Market liberalization and food security
Market liberalization is concerned with reducing the gap between set prices, 
which reflect policy intervention goals, and prices which reflect scarcity 
values. In the practical policy world, liberalization seeks out 'efficient” 
intervention and not necessarily "nonintervention”. Efficient intervention
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minimise sustained growth opportunity costs to achieve short-run welfare 
targets which arc largely distributional. Ineffective interventions, and those 
with unintended effects, are prime candidates for removal.
In the food market, government intervention has taken two major lines. 
On the one hand, governments have sought to maintain low and stable con­
sumer prices to ensure access to cheap food. On the other hand, they have 
tried to maintain high and stable producer prices to induce increased food 
availability. These policies have required government to use budgetary sub­
sidies to cover the gap and restrict trade to state monopolies for effective 
implementation. These interventions have stilled investment and adoption of 
innovation by limiting income growth.
In the context of food security, market liberalization is relevant not only 
to interventions in the food market, but also to macroeconomic policies 
which influence income and the dynamism of the agricultural sector. In 
urban areas, incomes and prices are important components of food security. 
Families eat what they can afford. In rural areas, consumption depends 
largely on what households can produce for themselves and can afford to 
buy to supplement their own food production. In this case too, incomes and 
prices are important.
Food availability is largely determined by the supply of food (either 
domestically produced or imported) which is influenced by the incentive 
structure, investment policy, import capacity, and a flexible institutional 
structure. The incentive structure encompasses producer pricing, availability 
of incentive goods, and the overall agricultural terms of trade—particularly 
relative prices.
While an appropriate incentive structure is important to induce both 
short-run supply responses and long term agricultural sector growth, incen­
tives are only effective when combined with supportive infrastructural 
investments. Transport infrastructure, extension services, marketing infra­
structure, agricultural research, and production infrastructure such as irriga­
tion are probably the most important infrastructural interventions for 
increasing food supplies, raising agricultural productivity, and the realization 
of producer’s efforts.
Due to Tanzania’s high reliance on rainfed agriculture, food supplies are 
highly erratic. To ensure adequate supplies, the country has had to 
frequently rely on imports during bad harvest years to supplement local sup­
plies and stocks. Thus, the ability to bridge food supply shortfalls has 
depended on the country’s import capacity. Consequently, the performance 
of the export sector and proper management of foreign exchange reserves is 
critical, given the many competing demands on the country’s limited foreign 
exchange earnings.
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Paradoxically, the agricultural sector is one of the most "public" in terms 
of policy and programme needs, but at the same time one of the most "pri­
vate" in terms of day to day production, marketing, and consumption decision 
making (Timmer, opt. cit.). Managing such a complex sector requires that 
government recognizes this dichotomy, while realizing the complementarity 
between the public and private sectors. Intervention should not interfere 
excessively with the micro level decision-making process, but rather canvas 
it for national policy goals.
Factors affecting access to food
Access to food is influenced by consumer-pricing policy, incomes policy, and 
food trade restrictions. Effective consumer pricing (subsidy) policy depends 
partly on the relative availability of commodities on the supply side and 
partly on budgetary ability to Finance it, given growth in food demand. 
Generalized subsidies on commodities consumed by both rich and poor house­
holds are an attractive policy option because they are simple to administer. 
Also, it is difficult to identify households below the poverty line that would 
qualify for income-determined subsidies. The key disadvantage of generalized 
subsidies, from the point of view of poverty alleviation, is that leakages to 
the rich are often large. In cases where generalised subsidies are introduced 
without adequate supplies-and a parallel market develops—the poorer, less 
influential households may not have the intended access to cheaper food. 
Removing subsidies under such conditions has little impact on the welfare of 
the poor. If subsidized prices are maintained by keeping producer prices 
low, food scarcity is exacerbated and rural incomes decline—worsening the 
poverty problem. In this case, appropriate liberalization would entail draw­
ing up an effective subsidy programme which responds to target welfare 
needs without encroaching on producer incentives.
On incomes policy side, both real income (ability to acquire food) and 
income distribution (for identification of vulnerable groups) are important. 
For urban households, wage policy plays a major role in determining real 
wage incomes in the formal labour market. However, the prevalence of in­
formal sector activities and large incomes form these activities makes anal­
ysis of the impact of wage policies on real income difficult, due to the pau­
city of reliable data. The fluidity of the adjustment processes in this sector 
and the frequent participation of typical households in both sectors further 
complicates the analysis. Typically, wage polices under adjustment and 
stabilization programmes limit (or sometimes freezes) salary and wage 
increases. Real wages tend to fall as prices increase faster. The reactions, 
even in the absence of strong labour unions, are not passive. Often house­
holds respond by making micro adjustments such as increasing their informal 
sector activities and reducing work time to match real wage declines.
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For rural households, producer prices and physical productivity are 
important income determinants. The distribution and ownership of productive 
resources—especially land tenure-play a key role in the distribution of rural 
incomes. Market liberalization typically involves raising the relative profit­
ability of tradeables by reducing currency overvaluation. Since export crops 
are predominantly produced by self-employed smallholders, devaluation will 
increase the incomes of these producers and also benefit consumers of non- 
traded goods.
HISTORY OF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPENT POLICY 
AND ITS IMPACT ON FOOD SECURITY
At independence, Tanzania inherited a dualistic agricultural sector. The 
plantation and estate sector, mainly owned by settler farmers, accounted for 
35 and 40% of exports and marketed output (by value), respectively. Sisal 
was the leading export and plantation crop. Estates produced up to 50% of 
the coffee and almost all tea, tobacco, sugar, and wheat. Peasants domina­
ted cotton, cashew nut, and oil seed production. The peasant sector was 
self-sufficient in food production and some "progressive farmers" produced 
adequate grain surpluses, particularly maize, to feed the urban areas.
Early interventions in the food market
Historically, Asian traders have dominated agricultural marketing outside the 
few areas with strong cooperatives. They were considered exploiting middle­
men, not only by nationalist politicians, but also by some colonial officials. 
State intervention in agricultural marketing in general, and grain marketing 
in particular, preceded independence. From 1946 to 1957, the Grain Storage 
Department had a monopoly to purchase all commercial production. It set 
high maize producer prices to encourage production, which led to surpluses 
that were exported at a financial loss to the colonial government. Guar­
anteed producer prices and government control of grain marketing was 
abandoned in 1957 and free grain markets, where prices were determined by 
supply and demand, prevailed until independence in 1961.
Changes following independence
Independence marked the beginning of a new era of government control of 
agricultural marketing. Following the 1960-61 drought, maize prices (partic­
ularly in Dar es Salaam) increased sharply and grain traders were blamed for 
the high price increases. In response, the government introduced the Agri­
cultural Products Act o f 1962 aimed at "controlling and regulating the prod­
uct, cultivation, and marketing of agricultural products” (Kriesel, et al.,1970, 
p.19). The act established a three-tier single-channel marketing system
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which granted the National Agricultural Products Board (NAPB) a monopoly 
to purchase commercial grain. Only direct sales from producers to consum­
ers were allowed and approval from the NAPB was required to transport sig­
nificant quantities of grains. The NAPB appointed Cooperative Unions as 
marketing agents which, directly or through their cooperative societies, pur­
chased maize and other food products from farmers and sold the produce to 
the NAPB for resale to grain millers. The main objective of the NAPB was 
to eliminate the middlemen. Kriesel et al. (1970, p.21) quote an NAPB 
report, stating that:
The one channel marketing system is designed to ensure that the 
price, movement, storage, and final export (or internal sale) of 
produce is centrally organised and controlled by a government 
agency. It does not necessarily operate cheaper than the "free” 
trade system but tends to eliminate the profit making middleman.
As we will see, intervention in the marketing of agricultural products has 
been a persistent characteristic of the political economy of agriculture in 
Tanzania.
First development strategy
After independence, the government’s agriculture development strategy was 
influenced by the World Bank report, The Economic Development of Tangan­
yika (1960). The proposed transformation approach was seen as the only 
possible way to achieve rapid agricultural growth. It involved settling 
Africans in newly-opened lands to start relatively capital intensive modern 
farms under the supervision of extension officers-thereby breaking away 
from traditional agriculture.
These settlement schemes were the cornerstone of the agricultural devel­
opment strategy of the First Five-Year Development Plan (1964 to 1969). 
These settlements were expensive. It was estimated that each settlement, 
which was supposed to include 250 comprehensively-planned individual farms 
with adequate social and economic infrastructure, would cost Tsh3.0 million. 
Sixty pilot projects were to be established by 1970 and 200 by 1980, upon 
completion of the 15-year perspective plan. Of the Tsh560 million planned 
to be invested in agriculture, the government allocated Tsh380 million to 
establish these new settlements.
Another development strategy involved encouraging farmers to improve 
their agricultural practices through extension and education. This "improve^ 
ment approach" was a continuation, in mild form, of the colonial agricultural 
extension strategy that attempted to regulate farming practices and control 
soil erosion through agricultural by-laws.
SOUTHERN AFRICA: FOOD SECURITY POLICY OPTIONS 71
In agricultural marketing, as noted above, the government gave the Coop­
erative Unions a monopoly to purchase commodities from farmers. In addi­
tion, the government introduced marketing cooperatives throughout the 
country, even in areas where they did not previously exist. The extensive 
introduction of marketing cooperatives increased marketing costs because 
most cooperatives incurred large overheads, and a lack of strict accounting 
and financial control systems led to grandiose theft (URT, 1968).
The officially-adopted development strategy failed to increase output. 
The settlement schemes were a costly failure. The capital equipment was 
not utilised to increase production. Also, peasants considered the settlement 
schemes to be government farms. Thus, in 1966 the transformation strategy 
was abandoned because the settlement schemes produced very little output, 
despite huge capital investments.
Post-indcpcndcnce production
Despite the failure of the official development strategy, in the first seven 
years after independence agricultural output grew rapidly, especially peasant 
production of export crops (Table 1).
Table 1. Production of main export crops, 1960-68, Tanzania (000 mt).
Crop 1960-62
Average
1966-68
Average
Growth rate 
Per annum (%)
Sisal 202.3 197.5 -0.5
Coffee 23.6 48.1 12.5
Cotton 33.5 70.0 13.0
Cashewnuts 45.1 74.3 9.0
Tea 4.0 6.4 8.0
Tobacco 2.2 3.8 10.0
Source: Coulson (1982).
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Particularly significant, the growth in export crop production did not 
occur at the expense of food crop output, but as a result of an increase in 
cultivated area. Widespread availability of consumer goods and surplus land 
allowed peasants to expand their area in cash-earning crops, enabling them 
to purchase off-farm consumer goods. Thus, despite stagnating or even 
declining producer prices, peasant production of export crops increased.
On the whole, food supplies were adequate and the growth rate in food 
output was higher than the population growth rate. Net maize imports were 
only large in 1961 and 1962, largely because of drought. By 1968 Tanzania 
had a surplus of 50,000 mt of maize which it exported at a loss (Coulson, 
1982). In the 1967-68 budget speech, the Minister of Finance noted that FAO 
and the Economic Commission for Africa statistics showed that Tanzania was 
the only African state which ’’has consistently maintained a growth trend in 
food production higher than that of population during the entire period 1954 
to 1966. This record is a high tribute indeed to the energy and initiative of 
the Tanzania farmer" (URT, 1967).
The increase in agricultural production was not caused by an increase in 
productivity. Farmers only used limited amounts of modern nonfarm inputs 
such as fertilizer and pesticides, mainly on crops which peasants grew for 
the first time. Tilling technology did not change as only a few areas 
benefited from the high-cost tractor hire system that was run by the coop­
eratives and subsidised by the government.
'Yhc, Arusha Declaration and villagization
President Nyerere viewed the development of cash crop farming as leading 
to capitalist development in the rural areas. He argued that:
Over large areas of the country peasant spend at least part of 
their time... on the cultivation of crops for sale-crops like cot­
ton, coffee, sisal, pyrethrum, and so on. But in this process, the 
old traditions of living together, working together and sharing 
the proceeds has often been abandoned. Farmers had to work as 
individuals, in competition and not in cooperation with neighbours.
And in many places, our most intelligent and hard-working peas­
ants have quite important farms of 10, 20, or even more acres.
To do this, they have employed other people to work for them 
(Nyerere, 1967).
The objective of the Arusha Declaration (1967) was to arrest capitalist
development in the rural areas by establishing Ujamaa villages- ’’economic 
and social communities where people live together and work together for the 
good of all". However, private household farms continued to produce the
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bulk of food and export crops. Communal farms have never accounted for 
more than 0.5% of total cultivated land, although government policy, partic­
ularly Presidential directives, have favoured communal production. The Pres­
idential Circular No. 1 directed that:
All government policies, activities, decisions of all government 
officials must therefore be geared toward emphasizing the advan­
tages of living and working together for the good of all; they 
should be angled at discouraging the continuation of private farm­
ing and should dampen down the urge for private expenditure on 
consumer and farm durables in favour of communal expenditure 
on things like cooperatively owned farm implements, stores, water 
supplies, good houses, dispensaries, nursery schools, roads, com­
munity centres, and so on... This means that it is to be the 
building of Ujamaa villages that government must now turn its 
attention. We have to organize our government and party machin­
ery to assist their establishment. We have to give them priority 
in all our credit, servicing, and extension services at the expense 
of the individual producer if necessary, and we also have to shift 
the emphasis of the cooperative movement from marketing to pro­
ducer cooperatives. Cooperative farming and cooperative produc­
tion must be looked upon as the main source of economic growth 
in rural areas ... (Nyerere, 1969).
With the president firmly advocating such policies, institutional and polit­
ical support for private farms, even those owned by smallholders, was limit­
ed. Thus, despite the Arusha Declaration’s emphasis on rural development, 
policies that provided incentives to individual farmers to increase output 
were neglected, as we shall see later.
Voluntary movement into Ujamaa villages was slow and below the political 
leaders’ expectation and desire. As a first move towards establishing Ujamaa 
tillages, the government initiated operations to settle people in permanent 
villages. Initially, this was confined to the poorest areas such as Dodoma, 
Kigoma, and Rufiji. In 1973, the TANU Biennial Conference resolved that all 
the rural population should be living in permanent villages by 1976. During 
the next three years, 1974 to 1976, many rural families were moved into 
8,000 villages.
Agricultural considerations did not guide village location. In most cases, 
the new villages were located close to a road. In the southern highlands, 
villages were located on ridges because roads were on ridges, although most 
of agricultural land was in the valleys (Friis-Hansen, 1987). Many villages 
grew too large, resulting in a scarcity of farm land close to villages.
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The villagization program disrupted production and increased real costs by 
increasing the distance from peasants’ homes to where their farms were 
located. Lofchie (1978) attributed the 1974 fall in agricultural production to 
the villagization campaign. He asserts that "there is a compelling reason to 
believe that the program of collective villagization was the major cause of a 
crisis in agricultural production of calamitous proportions" and dismisses cli­
matic factors. Apart from mixing villagization with collectivization, he 
missed the fact that a drought occurred in 1973-74, before villagization. 
Agricultural production decreased even in areas like Kilimanjaro which were 
not affected by villagization. While villagization had a long term adverse 
impact on agriculture, intellectual honesty requires not dismissing external 
factors simply because the government followed a wrong policy after the 
drought.
Market interventions in the 1970s
Before 1976, cooperatives had a monopoly on agricultural marketing. Many 
were inefficient, incurred financial losses, and delayed paying or never fully 
paid the peasants (Saul, 1971). The government abolished all cooperatives in 
1976 and introduced government-owned Crop Authorities responsible for pur­
chasing, processing, exporting, or selling locally; and providing extension 
services. Government’s policy of abolishing cooperatives was nonselective. 
A few Cooperative Unions were relatively efficient, had grass root support, 
and a long tradition of delivering services to farmers. Since relatively 
larger farmers controlled these cooperatives and were influential in local 
politics, the political objective of abolishing cooperatives was to remove an 
independent political base of the "Kulak" farmers.
The Crop Authorities did not eliminate inefficiencies in agricultural 
marketing, one of the leading stumbling block to rapid agricultural develop­
ment. The losses incurred by the Crop Authorities, partly due to the shill­
ing’s overvaluation and partly to their inefficiency, had to be covered by 
the government budget which started recording a recurrent budget deficit for 
the first time in 1978-79. In 1984 the government reintroduced Cooperative 
Unions. Again, the policy was nonselective. With few exceptions, similar 
cooperative structures were introduced in each region, regardless of whether 
there existed a tradition or grass root support of these institutions. More­
over, the Regional Cooperative Unions were supposed to purchase all surplus 
agricultural crops. In our view, many are over extended and have already 
incurred financial losses.
In 1967 after the Arusha Declaration, the state increased its control of 
the grain market by nationalizing the major grain milling companies and 
forming the National Milling Corporation (NMC). Until 1972, the National 
Agricultural Product Board (NAPB) controlled staple food grains (maize, rice,
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and wheat) marketing. The government set the NAPB into store price and 
the cooperative unions set producer prices after deducting marketing costs. 
In 1973 the NMC took over the activities of NAPB, and the NMC continued 
to use the Cooperative Unions as purchasing agents. When the Cooperative 
Unions were abolished in 1976, NMC took over direct purchasing of grain 
from producers; and transporting, milling, and wholesaling to the state-owned 
National Distributors Limited (NDL) and Regional Trading Companies (RTCs).
State intervention in commerce is not confined in agricultural marketing. 
After the Arusha Declaration, import, export, and wholesale trade were 
nationalized. Overtime, competition in wholesale and retail trade eroded, 
reducing the quality of services offered to peasants as consumers and prod­
ucers. The trade confinement policy gave monopoly power to a few agen­
cies, particularly RTCs, to sell essential inputs and consumer goods. This 
increased shortages, particularly in regions where the RTCs had liquidity 
problems.
Impact o f administrative controls
Gradually, administrative controls on the economy increased and peasant 
incentives to produce for the official market deteriorated. During the 1970s 
real prices of official agricultural products declined, particularly for exports 
(Table 2). Real producer prices of exports declined, mainly due to the high 
marketing margins of official marketing agencies and an increasingly over­
valued currency. The government responded to the severe food shortage in 
1974 by increasing official food crop prices, including less preferred foods 
such as cassava, sorghum, millet, and cowpeas. Officially marketed output of 
these crops increased significantly; but because the NMC was unable to sell 
these crops locally, they were exported at a loss. Official prices of pre­
ferred staples (mainly maize and rice) remained below the free market prices, 
except in remote regions such as Rukwa and Ruvuma (URT, MDB; various 
years a). Thus, officially marketed output generally decreased, except when 
there was a bumper harvest such as in 1977-78 and 1978-79.
Investment in agriculture
The adverse terms of trade facing the agriculture sector pulled resources 
away from agriculture. Also, institutional uncertainty discouraged investment 
in the agricultural sector. As relative prices of food crops tended to 
improve, smallholders allocated more of their resources into food production, 
relative to export crop production. Thus, food production grew while export 
production fell (Tables 3 and 4). The Ministry of Agriculture estimated that 
food production output grew at a high rate of approximately 8% for maize, 
paddy, and sorghum and millet during 1963-64 to 1983-84 (Table 4).
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Table 4. Ministry of agriculture estimates of production of major grains, 
1964-84, Tanzania (000 mt).
Year Maize Paddy Wheat Sorghum
1963-64 612 147 27 238
1964-65 532 73 33 266
1965-66 751 133 38 295
1966-67 629 110 35 265
1967-68 647 126 45 286
1968-69 602 138 41 282
1969-70 746 184 71 326
1970-71 730 193 84 279
1971-72 900 171 98 294
1972-73 853 214 87 277
1973-74 1,027 192 78 327
1974-75 1,272 241 49 435
1975-76 1,661 194 78 525
1976-77 1,654 354 59 604
1977-78 1,611 375 85 825
1978-79 1,888 351 71 1,157
1979-80 1,855 305 87 850
1980-81 1,840 350 91 705
1981-82 1,954 415 95 979
1982-83 2,324 409 71 793
1983-84 2,547 511 72 1,158
Source: Odegaard (1985).
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While these growth rates exceed the population growth rate of 3.3% and 
may appear exaggerated, the household budget surveys of 1969 and 1976-77 
indicate a similar growth rate for maize and a lower growth rate for paddy. 
Even with these high growth rates, per capita daily caloric intake was 2012 
cal in 1976-77, compared to 1365 cal in 1969. Available data suggest that 
the production and consumption of maize increased at the expense of root 
and tuber crops.
Food imports
Food imports have been important since the early 1970s, although they have 
fluctuated widely and do not show an increasing trend (Table 5). In 1973-74 
total imports of maize, wheat, and rice reached a peak of 396,000 mt, mainly 
because of a major drought. Large quantities of maize, wheat, and rice were 
also imported in 1980-81 (389,000 mt) and 1981-82 (369,000 mt). Since 1973- 
-74 per capita food imports have tended to decrease although the level has 
fluctuated widely.
From 1980-81 to 1983-84, when Tanzania was facing a severe balance of 
payments crisis that continues to the present, imports of major grains were 
persistently large. During this period, dependence on food aid was at its 
highest, accounting for 70% of total imports of maize, rice, and wheat (by 
value). Without the availability of food aid for famine relief, food insecu- 
rity-particularly in the urban and frequent food shortage regions like 
Dodomo-would have increased.
Fiscal burden
Prior to the 1974-75 food crisis, producer prices were determined by reduc­
ing the marketing margins from the into store price. After 1974-1975, the 
government increased producer prices to encourage production and set lower 
consumer prices to protect consumers. Yet, the increases in producer prices 
were inadequate to encourage peasants to increase their sales of maize and 
rice through official channels. Also, these policies resulted in large losses 
to the NMC which were covered by a subsidy from the government budget. 
Over time, the subsidy to NMC became an increasingly large fiscal burden, 
particularly after 1978 when the recurrent budget was persistently in deficit. 
The fiscal burden grew larger, the higher the proportion of domestically pro­
duced food grains in the NMC’s total sales, because imports were cheaper 
due to the overvalued shilling.
Exports
The overall impact of government intervention in agriculture contributed to 
the falling volume of exports that worsened the foreign exchange shortage 
that was triggered by the first increase in oil prices in 1973. Following the
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Uganda war in 1978-79 and the second oil price shock in 1979, the balance 
of payments situation worsened-increasing the shortage of intermediate 
inputs used to produce consumers goods and agricultural inputs. The short­
age of consumer goods was particularly severe in rural areas. To protect 
consumers, the government imposed price controls on most goods. As a 
result, parallel markets developed; but the shortage of goods remained acute 
in the rural areas, even in the parallel market.
Market production
The lack of incentive goods generally discouraged production for the market, 
particularly the official market. To increase the flow of food to official 
channel, the authorities restricted the movement of food grains across dis­
trict boundaries. Roadblocks were set up to inspect vehicles and prevent 
unauthorised transport of food grains. This increased the risk premium and 
cost to individuals illegally transporting grains as they had to bribe their 
way through the roadblocks. In addition, the foreign exchange shortage 
increased transport costs due to intermittent shortages of fuel, a lack of 
spare parts, and a deteriorating and decreasing stock of vehicles. The risk 
premium and the high costs were passed to consumers because the parallel 
market was a sellers’ market. Rent incomes from parallel market activities 
were high and attracted young people into petty trading.
Government’s response
The government grappled with the economic crisis with little success. In 
1980, it introduced the National Economic Survival Plan (NESP) that 
attempted to resolve the crisis by setting unrealistic targets on exports 
without adequate policy instruments to achieve those targets. The World 
Bank sponsored Tanzania Advisory Group (TAG) developed a Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP), based on financial inflow from the World Bank 
and the IMF of US$600 million over three years (1982-83 to 1984-85). As 
the government did not reach an agreement with the IMF and the World 
Bank on devaluation and other policy measures, the SAP was never fully 
implemented.
The government was unwilling to tolerate the intensification of parallel 
market activities, so in 1983 it attempted to crush the parallel market by 
declaring a "war against economic saboteurs and racketeers.” Many parallel 
market traders were detained and tried in special courts. Since the shortage 
of goods was real, it did not end with the imprisoning of some racketeers.
The government-appointed Task Force on the Agricultural Sector 
examined past policies and recommended adopting market-oriented agricul­
tural development policies with a strong incentive structure. In 1983 after
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some hesitation, the government adopted the policy recommendation, but 
those policies have yet to be completely implemented.
In 1984 the government adopted policy measures that departed from its 
previous policy stance. These policies included reducing government min­
istries to streamline administration and reduce government expenditure; 
reintroducing cooperatives and removing Crop Authorities; devaluing the 
shilling by 26% (in dollar terms); substantial increasing producer prices for 
major export and food crops; removing consumer subsidies; and most impor­
tant, allowing individuals who owned foreign exchange to import goods and 
sell them at whatever price they could fetch. In effect, the government 
adopted a more liberal attitude to the private sector.
IMPACT OF POLICY INTERVENTIONS 
ON FOOD SECURITY
Government interventions in the food market have had two main and seem­
ingly conflicting objectives. On the one hand, government has sought to 
achieve food self-sufficiency through increased production. On the other 
hand, it has attempted to enhance access to cheap food by poor urban con­
sumers through food subsidies. Achieving the two objectives requires simul­
taneously maintaining high real prices to producers to stimulate increased 
production and keeping consumer prices low.
The previously described control regime has had an impact on both avail­
ability and accessibility to food. On the availability side we will review the 
trend of real producer and open market prices for major staples, official 
marketed quantities, food availability index, the coefficient of variation of 
food prices, the share of marketed output going to official markets, open 
market consumer prices, and the purchasing power of the urban minimum 
wage earners.
Producer prices
A closer look at real official producer prices of maize, paddy, and wheat 
shows they have generally declined after the 1975-76 peak (Table 6) due to 
the accelerating rate of inflation which Tanzania has experienced in recent 
years. Thus, even substantial nominal price increases were insufficient to 
increase the real value of the producer prices.
The average inflation rate increased form 13% during the period 1973-74 
and 1977-78 to about 30% by 1981-82. During the same period, the real pro­
ducer price of paddy has fluctuated less than that of maize. For wheat, 
the situation was even worse. Not only has the real price been declining
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Tabic 6. Real producer prices of maize, paddy, and wheat 1971-72, to 
1986-87, Tanzania (Tsh per kg)a.
Maize Paddy Wheat
Money Real 
Prices Prices
1971-72 0.24 2.72
1972-73 0.26 2.70
1973-74 0.33 3.00
1974-75 0.55 3.66
1975-76 0.80 5.07
1976-77 0.80 4.64
1977-78 0.85 4.41
1978-79 0.85 3.94
1979-80 1.00 3.88
1980-81 1.00 2.95
1981-82 1.50 3.57
1982-83 1.75 3.15
1983-84 2.20 3.11
1984-85 4.00 4.00
1985-86 5.25 3.89
1986-87 6.30 3.18
Money Real Money Real
Prices Prices Prices Prices
0.52 5.88 0.59 6.45
0.56 5.81 0.57 5.92
0.57 5.14 0.57 5.14
0.65 4.76 0.77 5.64
1.00 6.34 1.00 6.34
1.00 5.80 1.20 6.96
1.20 6.22 1.25 6.48
1.20 5.56 1.25 5.80
1.50 5.82 1.35 5.24
1.75 5.16 1.65 4.87
2.30 5.48 2.20 5.24
3.00 5.39 2.50 4.49
4.00 5.66 3.00 4.25
6.00 6.00 4.50 4.50
8.00 5.93 6.00 4.44
9.60 5.69 7.20 4.34
aTanzania CPI used as deflator 
Source: UTZ, MDB (1986a).
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Tabic 7. Official3 purchases of maize, paddy, rice, and wheat, 1971-72, 
to 1986-87, Tanzania (000 mt)-
Marketing Maize Paddy Rice Total Wheat Total
Year preferred
staples
1971-72 43.0 68.6
1972-73 106.4 73.1
1973-74 73.8 59.6
1974-75 23.9 22.7
1975-76 91.1 11.7
1976-77 127.5 12.2
1977-78 213.2 24.6
1978-79 220.4 26.9
1979-80 161.5 29.7
1980-81 104.6 4.8
1981-82 89.4 4.5
1982-83 86.0 12.1
1983-84 71.0 13.5
1984-85 90.0 5.5
1985-86° 178.5 24.5
1986-87° 127.8 17.5
NA 44.6 56.7 144.3
NA 47.5 46.8 200.7
NA 38.7 27.9 140.4
NA 14.8 14.4 53.1
4.4 12.0 24.5 127.6
6.7 14.6 27.1 169.2
19.1 35.1 35.3 283.6
16.5 34.0 28.8 283.2
10.9 30.2 26.6 218.3
10.4 13.5 27.9 146.0
12.1 15.0 23.1 127.5
13.0 20.9 31.2 138.1
13.3 22.0 28.3 121.3
8.6 12.2 33.2 135.4
NA 15.9 50.3 244.7
NA 11.4 33.7 172.9
aOfficial channels include NMC, its predecessor, the National Agricultural 
Products Board (NAPF), and Regional Cooperative Unions (RCU’s). 
^Purchases by (RCU’s)
Source: URT, MDB (various years a)
the late 1970s, but in 1986-87 the nominal producer price (Tsh7.20 per kg) 
fell to its second lowest real price since 1971-72. The main reasons for 
low official nominal prices to farmers were the governments’ input subsidiza­
tion policy and budgetary pressures stemming from the government’s cov­
erage of NMC losses.
Input use
Government believed that it could modernize agriculture by subsidizing pro­
ducer efforts. This strategy failed to have the intended impact, except in a
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few regions such as Ruvuma, Iringa, Mbeya, and most recently Rukwa. Even 
in these regions there is no conclusive evidence to show that input sub­
sidization led to improved farming.
Several problems contributed to policy’s ineffectiveness. First, there was 
apparent competition for inputs between food and export crops, with the 
latter taking a greater share. Second, due to governmental budgetary con­
straints, demand greatly exceeded available supply. As a result, many farm­
ers did not apply recommended quantities. Also, inputs were distributed late 
due to transportation bottlenecks.
Production and official marketings
These policies worked against achieving food self-sufficiency as incentives to 
increase production declined. Low real producer prices and late payments to 
farmers were the main factors responsible for the decline in official staple 
grain purchases, especially maize between 1978-79 to 1984-85 (Table 7). The 
period of declining official maize purchases corresponds closely to the period 
of declining real producer prices. Due to the growing food shortages and 
low real producer prices paid by the official marketing agencies, a parallel 
market began to develop. Although data on open market producer prices are 
only available for the last four years, it is generally accepted that these 
prices have been higher over most of the period (URT, MDB; 1986a).
In years when the price differential between official and open market 
prices was narrower than during previous years, official purchases of food 
grains increased. For example, official maize purchases increased signif­
icantly between 1984-85 and 1985-86 (Table 7), not only due to a bumper 
harvest but also because the more relaxed official attitude towards the open 
market which resulted in relatively low open market prices-particularly for 
rice and wheat. Apart from rice and wheat, open market producer prices for 
maize and paddy fell during that period (Table 8).
The absence of an effective system for enforcing official subsidized prices 
meant that consumers had to rely on the parallel market for their basic 
foods. Existing time-series data on open market consumer price for maize, 
rice, and wheat from the early 1970s to the early 1980s show that they were 
almost always significantly higher than official consumer prices (Table 9). 
Beginning in November 1982, the MDB started collecting such data monthly. 
Higher open market consumer prices are not totally a result of excess 
demand, but are also due to high transport charges and costs associated with 
the risks of being caught trading illegally.
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Table 8. Open market producer prices for 
1982-83 to 1985-86, Tanzania (Tsh per kg).
maize. paddy, wheat, and rice,
Year Maize Paddy Rice Wheat
1982-83 3.80 4.06 10.80 5.15
1983-84 10.93 9.12 11.30 NA
1984-85 7.57 10.82 18.09 12.03
t985-86 7.52 9.42 29.26 22.18
NA indicates data not available. 
Source: URT, MDB (various years a).
Tabic 9. Official and open market consumer prices for maize flour, maize 
grain, rice, and wheat, 1973-74 to 1985-86, Tanzania (Tsh per kg).
MAIZR________  RICK WHKAT
Flour_______  Grain _______________  _____ Flour
Year Official Open
OMPM
Official
OPR
Open
OMPR
Official
OPWF
Open
OPMFW
1973 0.80 NA NA 1.65 NA 1.65 NA
1974 1.25 NA NA 2.00 NA 2.40 NA
1975 1.25 NA NA 4.00 NA 3.75 NA
1976 1.75 NA NA 4.00 NA 3.75 NA
1977 1.75 NA NA 3.50 NA 3.75 NA
1978 1.75 NA NA 3.50 NA 3.75 NA
1979 1.75 NA NA 3.50 NA 3.75 NA
1980 1.25 NA NA 5.35 NA 5.65 NA
1981 2.50 NA NA 5.35 NA 5.65 NA
1982 2.50 5.90 NA 5.35 15.85 5.65 17.80
1983 2.50 10.58 12.20 7.20 24.05 8.00 25.12
1984 8.00 13.29 10.78 13.40 29.03 14.50 4 0 1
1985 13.75 17.14 9.65 14.50 13.57 17.20 35.53
Source: URT, MDB (1986a).
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Availibility of consumer goods
Shortages of nonfood consumer goods affected rural areas the most. A survey 
of rural households in four regions of Tanzania found that 40 to 50% of the 
households were sometimes unable to purchase agricultural implements; and 
over 90% could sometimes not buy consumer goods such as sugar, soap, and 
cooking oil. The high coefficient of variation of quantity bought (ranging 
from 0.4 to 1.0 for official purchases and 0.2 to 1.3 for unofficial purchases) 
confirms the probabilistic nature of household access to consumer goods in 
both official and open markets (Collier, et al., 1985).
Food availability in urban areas has also deteriorated from the late 1970s. 
Using data on availability of 25 foodstuffs in 20 unregulated urban food 
markets, Collier constructed an index of availability for the 1978 to 1982 
period. These data indicate that the proportion of attempted, but 
unsuccessful purchases rose sharply between 1978 and 1982 (Table 10.)
Traders in the parallel markets have faced difficulties, due to their status 
as illegal participants and high transportation costs. From the 1960s to 
1980, the trade network was insufficiently dense to form an integrated par­
allel market. A MDB study found that the parallel market network has 
actually deteriorated as indicated by a rise in the coefficient of variation 
of food prices in regional urban centers from 0.14 (1964), to 0.24 (1970), to 
0.30 (1980).
It appears that this situation started to change after 1984, when measures 
were taken to deregulate the food market and relax trade controls. The 
coefficient of variation for maize and rice price in 29 urban markets fell
from 0.30 (1980), to 0.29 (1984-85), to 0.20 (1985), and finally to 0.18 in 
1986-87 (computed from data reported in URT, MDB; various years a).
Table 10. Availability o f 25 foodstuffs in 20 urban markets, 1978 to 1982, 
Tanzania.
Year Availability index3 Number of attempts
1978 0.154 4,650
1979 0.201 3,975
1980 0.216 4,425
1981 0.242 4,725
1982 0.283 5,025
Probability that an attempted purchase is unsuccessful. 
Source: Collier el al. (1985), p. 415.
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Sales to official and open markets
Another impact of government intervention in the food market could be 
deduced from the share of marketed output that goes to the official and 
open markets (Table 11). From the late 1970s to 1983-84, about 20% of 
maize production was marketed. Of this marketed surplus, 25% was sold 
through the official market and 75% through open markets. The share of 
the marketed surplus going to the official market increased between 1984-85 
and 1985-86 as a result of bumper harvests and a relative decline in the 
open, market price of maize grain.
During the period, 50% of total rice production (paddy) was marketed, 
with 20% going to the official channel and 80% through open markets. The 
share of the marketed rice surplus going to the open market has been 
increasing continuously because prices on the open market were far above 
official prices. This is partly because the main paddy production areas 
(Morogoro, Shinyanga, and Mwanza) have a relatively high population and 
are near other major consumption centers such as Dar es Salaam, Dodoma, 
and the lake region.
Purchasing power
The ineffectiveness of food subsidies can be partly measured by the declining 
purchasing power of the minimum urban wage earners, and partly by the
Table 11. Share of marketed output of maize and paddy going to official 
and open markets, 1970s to 1986-87, Tanzania (%)a.
Year Maize Paddv
Marketed Market share Marketed 
surplus2 Official Open surplus3
Market share 
Official Open
Pre-1984c 20 25 75 50 20 80
1984-85 25 25 75 50 14 86
1985-86 25 36 64 50 13 87
1986-87 25 36 64 50 7 93
aMarketed surplus as a percent of total production. ^Share of marketed sur­
plus going to each market. c1970s to 1983-84.
Source: URT, MDB (various years a).
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trend of official and open market consumer prices. Tabic 12 clearly shows 
that the purchasing power of the minimum urban wage has declined rather 
steadily, implying that individuals earning the minimum wage would have dif­
ficulty feeding their families—even if they had access to official food 
sources. However, few urban consumers have access to official food supplies 
since most households buy their food from open markets. Consumer food 
prices (Table 9) are partly higher because producer prices are higher and 
partly due to higher marketing cost due to the illegal status under which 
parallel markets operate. As a result, the purchasing power of many poor 
urban consumers has further eroded. Thus, attempts to control food prices 
at official levels have made food more, not less, expensive by increasing 
marketing costs of both the NMC and traders in the parallel market.
Government budget
Government intervention in the food market has also had budgetary implica­
tions. Subsidizing food production (ie., low input prices) and consumption 
(low consumer prices) has escalated government expenditure on subsidies. 
Government subsidies on fertilizer and maize flour have increased substan­
tially from 1976-77 to 1983-84 (Table 13).
In addition to these subsidies, the government subsidized the increasing 
marketing losses of the NMC, resulting from increasing unit cost of market­
ing and handling a declining volume of officially marketed output. Unfor­
tunately, the possibility of reducing the size of NMC as the volume of 
marketed output declined was not considered. Government subsidies to the 
NMC during the last three years prior to market liberalization were Tsh405 
million in 1981-82, Tsh216 million in 1982-83, and Tsh318 million in 1983-84. 
Together with input and consumer subsidies, these subsidies were mainly 
absorbed by running budgetary deficits which increased almost annually.
In summary, government intervention in the food market did not 
achieve its intended goals. First, as a result of declining real producer 
prices and the decreasing availability of incentive goods, production growth 
slackened-increasing food shortages and making price control policy 
ineffective. This in turn contributed to the development of a parallel 
market. By 1983 the parallel market dominated the food market and the 
government actually tolerated its existence—even though it was still illegal. 
Second, since most consumers in urban and deficit rural areas did not have 
access to subsidized food, they had to turn to the parallel market where 
prices were considerably higher. Thus, the policy of enhancing accessibility 
to food among the poor through food subsidies turned out to hurt this group 
most. The regulated market could neither increase food availability nor help 
the target group get access to low-priced food. Third, subsidizing consumers
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Table 12. Purchasing power in terms of maize flour and rice (kg of staple 
per day’s wage) at official and open market prices, 1973-1987, Tanzania.
Maize flour Rice
Year Official Open Official Open
1973 10.0 NA 4.8 NA
1974 9.1 NA 5.7 NA
1975 10.1 NA 3.2 NA
1976 7.2 NA 3.2 NA
1977 7.2 NA 3.6 NA
1978 7.2 NA 3.6 NA
1979 7.2 NA 3.6 NA
1980 12.8 NA 3.0 NA
1981 8.0 NA 3.7 NA
1982 8.0 3.85 3.7 1.38
1983 8.0 3.21 2.8 1.06
1984 3.4 1.89 2.0 0.77
1985 2.0 2.62 1.9 0.80
1986 NA 3.19 1.19 0.95
1987 NA 3.60 1.09 0.99
Source: URT, MDB (1987a)
Table 13. Government subsidies for fertilizer and maize flour, 1976-77 to
1983-84, Tanzania (Tsh million).
Year Fertilizer Maize flour
1976-77 49.693 49.349
1977-78 100.000 84.263
1978-79 135.400 562.350
1979-80 134.692 419.080
1980-81 136.450 125.151
1981-82 202.800 405.290
1982-83 195.970 216.550
1983-84 215.000 245.630
Source: URT, MFFP (1986).
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and NMC losses since 1975 created budgetary pressure on the government 
which inhibited any attempts to increase real producer prices. All put 
together, by 1984 the government had sufficient reasons to liberalize the 
food market. The following section analyses market liberalization and its 
impact on food security.
MARKET LIBERALIZATION 
AND FOOD SECURITY
The previous analysis of government interventions in the food market and 
their impacts, relative to intervention goals, clearly shows that despite gov­
ernment intervention to set prices, the food market in Tanzania has 
remained by and large price-flex. The parallel markets, where market­
clearing prices exert themselves, have dominated the dual market structure
Table 14. Official and parallel marketing margins for maize and rice, 1984- 
85 to 1986-87, Tanzania (Tsh per mt).
Maize Rice
Price 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87
Producer price
Official 3,992 5,226 6,300 10,684 12,308 14,688
Open market 8,611 7,529 8,000 18,090 29,261 31,600
Ex-store cost
Official 7,582 10,854 12,215 NA NA NA
Consumer prices
Official NA NA NA 13,950 16,750 28,880
Open market 10,780 9,650 10,357 36,070 37,570 36,810
Marketing margin
Official 2,757 5,628 5,915 3,266 4,443 14,192
Private trader 2,169 
Margin/producer price
2,121 2,357 18,000 8,320 5,210
Official 0.69 1.08 0.96 0.31 0.36 0.94
Open market 0.25 0.28 0.29 1.00 0.28 0.16
Source: Computations based on data from URT, MDB (various years a).
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that ensued from the intervention. In fact, of the major staples under gov­
ernment control, maize and rice-which account for 71% of total caloric 
intake in the diets (URT, MDB, 1985a)--are channelled predominantly through 
the parallel markets. Over the 1984-85 to 1986-87 period, parallel markets’ 
shares of marketed maize and rice averaged 68 and 87%, respectively (Table 
11). Despite costs associated with risks for contravening controls, private 
traders on average paid higher prices to producers and had significantly 
lower marketing margins than the official marketing system (Table 14).
Stimulus for liberalization
Pressure for liberalizing the food market stems from three sources. First, 
food scarcity arising from inadequate supplies invalidated price controls as 
parallel market prices for controlled grains became the effective prices. 
Second, because price controls were ineffective, the target group for food 
subsidies-the urban poor and rural food deficit households-did not have 
access to cheaper official supplies. Official supplies found their way to the 
less vulnerable and influential consumers; and quite often, via leakage to the 
parallel market, official supplies went to supplement trader’s rental incomes 
through resales. Third, budgetary pressures increased as expenditure on sub­
sidies escalated.
In addition to the increased cost of marketing and handling produce 
(stemming from increased unit costs as volumes declined without adjustment 
in the size of the official marketing agency), government incurred additional 
costs from its effort to support producer price increases via absorbing the 
growing losses of the official marketing agency (NMC). However, the 
budget-supported producer prices increases were outstripped by the high rate 
of inflation. This resulted in reduced real official producer prices, which 
further compounded the general problem of scarcity and increased switching 
away from official market sales.
Under these conditions, liberalization of controls become attractive to the 
government in order to reduce the increasing budgetary pressures. Also, it 
involved negligible political risk, in view of the ineffectiveness of the sub­
sidy programme. The fact that most of the liberalization measures were 
initiated starting July 1984, before the adoption of the IMF programme in 
October 1986, partial supports this assertion.
Major liberalization thrusts
The government adopted two major types of market liberalization meas­
ures. The first category included direct, micro level modifications of exist­
ing interventions in the food market. These were generally geared towards 
modifying official prices so they more closely reflected scarcity prices.
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Micro level policy measures
Micro level policy changes initiated since July 1984 have included the follow­
ing measures:
o The gap between official ex-store cost and consumer prices was 
narrowed. Consumer prices were raised by removing the consumer 
subsidies, especially for maize, in order to reduce budgetary deficits 
arising from official food trade. This was achieved rather quickly, 
o Real producer prices were raised by 5% per annum to correct for the 
historical decline and thereby induce greater production and increase 
the share of sales to the official marketing system. A key objective 
of this measure was to reduce scarcities by increasing supplies- 
thereby achieving sustainable national food security. This measure 
narrowed the gap between official and effective parallel market prices, 
o Bottlenecks to private trade in scheduled food crops were reduced. 
Road blocks were removed. Initially, private traders were allowed to 
buy and transport up to 500 kgs per lot, but in March 1987 the quan­
tity restriction was removed. Under the current marketing system, the 
rcinstituted Cooperative Unions buy from and sell to the NMC; and 
parallel to this system, private traders are also permitted to trade in 
food. The official system guarantees purchases at set floor prices, 
o Agricultural input subsidies were removed, with higher producer prices 
set to increase farm profitability and encourage farmers to adopt 
improved crop husbandry and innovation. This measure was partly 
introduced to shift the tying of rewards from manufactured fertilizer 
to the whole range of improvement efforts.
Macro level measures
The second category of market liberalization measures included macro­
economic policy initiatives that were geared, among other things, to enhanc­
ing agricultural dynamism; and were included primarily in the Economic 
Recovery Programme adopted in July 1986. These included the following
measures:
o Partial import liberalization was instituted in July 1984, allowing 
individuals with access to their own foreign exchange to import incen­
tive goods inter alia and sell them at market-clearing prices in order 
to increase the supply of incentive goods. This policy implied a major 
devaluation on the implicit exchange rate of imports which significant­
ly increased profits to owners of foreign exchange and, as a result, 
reversed capital flight. The response to this move was greater than 
anticipated. Imports of goods totalled more than US$400 million in 
both 1985 and 1986, exceeding official export earnings (Ndulu and 
Hyuha, 1987; Ndulu, Lyakurwa, Semboja, and Chaligha, 1987). This
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measure significantly increased the supply of incentive goods and com­
plemented the producer price increase effects on the supply of food. 
One visible effect was the disappearance of time-consuming queues for 
scarce commodities and the use of permits to acquire commodities pre­
viously in severely scarcity.
o Exchange rate adjustments to correct for overvaluation started in ear­
nest in July 1984 when the government devalued the currency by 31%, 
in terms of the Tanzanian shilling. Starting in March of 1986, 
Tanzania decided to quickly reduce the currency overvaluation. The 
shilling was rapidly depreciated from Tshl7 to the US$ in March of 
1986, to Tsh40 in July of 1986. Thereafter, through a crawling peg, it 
was further depreciated to Tsh70 to the US$ by October of 1987.
This move, coupled with the decision to offer producers at least 70% of 
world market prices has significantly shifted the terms of trade in favour of 
agriculture. The implicit tax on agriculture resulting from overvaluation has 
been significantly reduced, raising the relative profitability of agriculture as 
a whole. Explicit taxation on local food produccrs-measured as the differ­
ence between c.i.f. cost of imports at official exchange rate and farm gate 
prices (official) of local supplies-was wiped out starting 1984, as farm gate 
prices rose sharply for maize and rice. However, the gap between the 
import cost (valued at the real exchange rate) and domestic farm gate prices 
continued to be significantly higher for maize than rice. For rice, the gap 
closed during 1985 as world market prices declined while prices to local pro­
duces continued to increase. These comparisons are made net of transfer 
costs in the domestic market.
IMPACTS ON THE FOOD MARKET:
A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
Food supplies
Combined with good weather during 1985-86 and 1986-87, the above measures 
significantly increased food supplies, especially maize and rice. In 1984-85, 
an above average year, maize production reached an estimated 2.093 million 
mt and paddy production rose to 427,000 m t-an increase of about 8% and 
20% over the 1983-84 level, respectively. In 1985-86, both maize and paddy 
production again increased rapidly. The maize harvest rose to an estimated 
2.211 million mt (5.6% over 1984-85) while paddy output increased to 547,000 
mt (28.1% over 1984-85). Estimates for 1986-87 show further production 
increases for these two major staples of 6.7% for maize and 17.7% for paddy 
(URT, MDB 1987a, p.9).
The estimated production increases reported above are well corroborated 
by consumer price movements in the open market, the dominant market
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reflecting scarcities. After reaching a peak during 1983-84, the average open 
market consumer prices for maize declined significantly during 1984-85 and 
have remained below the 1983-84 peak up to 1987. For rice, open market 
consumer prices more or less stabilized at the 1984 level. The decrease in 
the maize consumer prices and stabilization of rice prices occurred despite 
significant reductions in imports of both commodities (URT, MDB; 1985, 1986, 
1987a).
Official purchases
Official maize purchases increased on average by 40% per annum over the 
period 1984-85 to 1986-87, partly in response to increased production and 
partly due to increases in the official producer prices, relative to open 
market producer prices. Although in absolute terms, open market prices 
generally remained above official throughout the period, the gap was closing 
rapidly. By 1985-86, the official price reached 70% of the open market 
prices, up from 50% in 1984-85. In 1986-87, official prices reached 78.8% of 
the open market producer prices (Table 14). These national averages hide 
the fact that in Ruvuma and Rukwa-the two remote and major surplus 
regions which account for over 30% of official procurement—official producer 
prices were defacto support prices, exceeding open market prices throughout 
the period.
Official rice purchases continued to decline, despite increases in produc­
tion, mainly because the price gap between the two markets increased. 
While official producer prices were 59% of open market prices during 1984-85, 
they were a mere 42% and 46.5% of open market prices in 1985-86 and 1986- 
87, respectively. Over the period, open market producer prices increased by 
74.7% while official prices increased by a mere 37.5% (Table 14). While the 
share of purchases from state farms increased during the period, smallholders 
significantly decreased their sales to official markets (URT, MDB; 1986a p.10).
Since March 1987, the NMC’s maize stocks have reached record levels, 
estimated at over 200,000 mt. Slow local sales, due to both the fact that 
open market consumer prices were on average lower and export sales could 
only be undertaken at significant losses, has generated a liquidity crunch for 
official agents with far-reaching consequences. The liquidity tied up in 
nonmoving stocks has had backwash effects on continued purchases at 
official prices. This is worsened by the stringent credit ceilings of the 
recovery programme which affect not only continued purchases, but also 
credit to other sectors. Interest costs of tied up credit and storage losses 
compound the financial problems of official agencies. Projected increased 
margins are yet to be realized by the NMC since they are tied up in stocks. 
Whether they are ever realized will depend on whether or not stocks will be 
sold at a loss.
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Producer income
In contrast, producers have achieved significant income gains. In high 
potential areas, estimated returns to labour per day from maize (valued at 
official prices) have increased by 112% over the period 1983-84 to 1986-87 
(URT, MDB; various years a). For lowland paddy producers, estimated 
return to labour per day rose by 111% over the same period (MDB, 1984a). 
These income increases are predominantly price based, although production 
increases partially explain the increases.
In major maize surplus regions, especially Rukwa and Ruvuma, official 
producer prices were support prices, since they exceeded open market prices. 
As pressure from excessive stocks asserts itself, it is very likely that open 
market producer prices will decline (some current casual observation supports 
this assertion). Mandatorty purchases at above official open market prices 
by official agencies has, and continue, to constitute income transfers to pro­
ducers.
Access to food
On the consumers’ side, liberalization of cereal trade has improved access to 
food. Open market consumer prices for maize, as earlier noted, have declin­
ed. The share of open market purchases by consumers exceeds 75%. This is 
further strenghened by the fact that at the currently higher official con­
sumer prices, private consumers hardly buy at all from official sources, as 
indicated by the decline in NMC sales since 1985-86 (URT, MDB; 1986a, p. 
17). Combined with wage increases, the purchasing power of a day’s 
minimum wage in terms of maize flour (at open market prices) increased 
from a low of 1.89 kg in 1984 to 3.60 kg in 1987 (Table 12). In contrast, 
the relative position of those who procure from official channels has def­
initely declined. Most of these purchases are institutional, usually subsumed 
in official budgets. For rice, the purchasing power of the daily minimum 
wage (at open market prices) increased from 0.77 kg to 0.99 kg over the 
same period. In the case of rice, open market consumer purchases are 
estimated to constitute 93% of total purchases (Table 11). Thus, the increase 
in real purchasing power for rice was totally accounted for by increases in 
minimum wages, since the consumer price of rice did not decline over the 
period.
Interregional movement of supplies
Interregional movement of supplies improved as road blocks were removed 
and private traders increased their participation in food trade. The decline 
in private trading margins, especially for rice partly reflects reduced costs 
previously associated with risks from violating controls (Table 14). Spatial 
variation in open market consumer prices significantly declined as shown by
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the steep decrease of coefficient of variation for these prices, from 0.29 in 
1983-84 to 0.18 in 1986-87 (URT, MDB; 1986a). This had the effect of 
reducing prices in food deficit areas as supplies increased. Typical deficit 
areas such as Dodoma, Shinyanga, Kahama, and Tabora all have shown 
below national average increases in the food CPI since 1985-86 (URT, MDB; 
1987a).
Agricultural sector income share
At a more aggregate level, a major shift has occurred in the share of 
income going to agricultural producers. This shift started in 1982 with the 
Structural Adjustment Programme which focused partly on raising prices to 
agricultural producers. It has accelerated since 1984 due to the concerted 
effort to raise real producer prices, which implied faster rates of increase in 
nominal prices. As pointed out earlier, this resulted from less reliance on 
budgetary support, removal of food subsidies, and adjusting the exchange 
rate.
National accounts data indicate that the share of nominal income going 
to agricultural producers jumped from an average of 43% from 1976 to 1981, 
to 50% in 1982, and then continued to move upwards-reaching 58.9% in 1986 
(Table 15).
Nominal income of agricultural producers rose at an average rate of 36.9% 
over the period 1984-1986. If this rate of increase is compared with the 
33.9% average annual increase in the CPI (URT, MDB; 1986a), agricultural 
pro-ducers’ real income increased at a rate of 3% over the period. In con­
trast, during the 1980-84 period when nominal income rose by an average of 
25.5% per annum, the average annual rate of inflation was 27.9%. This 
implied a decline in real income for agricultural producers of 2.45% per 
annum.
The increase in real income during the 1984-86 period was partly due to 
increases in nominal incomes (explained mostly by increases in producer 
prices) and partly to real growth in output, although producer prices had a 
stronger influence in explaining changes in nominal incomes.
The increase in agriculture’s share of national income is strongly 
explained by agricultural prices, relative to non-agricultural prices, which 
rose by 31.7% over the period. Agricultural producers’ relative prices were 
computed as the ratio of GDP deflators for agriculture and nonagricultural 
sectors.
SOUTHERN AFRICA: FOOD SECURITY POLICY OPTIONS 97
Tabic 15. Nominal agricultural incomes and relative profitability o f agri­
culture, 1976-1986, Tanzania.
Year Nominal agricultural GDP Relative price of
__________________________________  agricultural to
Value
(Tsh million)
Growth rate Share 
(percent) (Percent)
nonagricultural
activities3
1976 9,046 NA 42 100.0
1977 11,131 23 44 106.1
1978 12,506 12 44 113.6
1979 14,728 18 44 128.2
1980 16,636 13 44 122.8
1981 20,338 22 46 128.4
1982 26,449 30 50 152,1
1983 32,737 24 54 167.4
1984 41,295 26 54 180.5
1985 56,235 37 57 1%.9
1986 77,3% 38 59 220.5
aRatio of agricultural GDP implicit deflator to non-agricultural GDP 
deflator. NA indicates data not available.
Source: URT (1986b).
CONCLUSION
These results indicate that the rural population as a group increased their 
access to food through increases in real income. Given an income elasticity 
of demand for food of 0.89 for rural households, food consumption in these 
households very probably increased by 2.67% per annum over the 1984-86 
period.
The picture for the urban households is more difficult to discern in view 
of the likely growth of informal sector incomes. However, national accounts 
statistics indicate that the nominal incomes of non-agriculturalists increased 
by 24.04% per annum over the 1984-86 period. When compared to the annual 
average rate of CPI of 33.9% over the same period, the real incomes of this 
group declined by 6.01% per annum. However, the food component of the
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CPI registered a significantly lower rate of increase—25.82% annually (URT, 
DEVPLAN) 1986a. Thus, in terms of consumption, real income decreased by 
only 1.78% over the whole period. The rate of decline in real income of 
non-agriculturalist was significantly reduced, compared to the 1980-84 sit­
uation. During that period, nominal incomes increased at an average rate of 
12.65%, compared with the average inflation rate of 27.9% (URT, DEVPLAN, 
1986a). This implied an annual rate of decline of real income of 15.25%.
These preliminary estimates of the impacts of market liberalization on 
food supplies, consumption, and income were supported by two consecutive 
years of good weather. They indicate generally increased availability of 
food, improved access to food in rural areas, and some decline in the rate of 
deterioration of urban real income in terms of food. Furthermore, the geog­
raphical flow of food supplies improved, as indicated by the reduced price 
dispersion. In the next phase of the study, we will undertake a more micro 
level analysis of impacts, taking into account income distribution and the 
identification of vulnerable groups.
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